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Abstract
This paper examines whether legislators earmark funds in order to constrain the spending
of future legislators with different preferences.  Specifically, panel data is used to estimate the
probability a new environmental earmarking law is passed as a function of Democrats holding and
subsequently losing majority control of the government.  The results of this study do not support this
hypothesis.  In fact, Democrats with a large majority who subsequently lose this majority power
following the next election are found to be less likely to earmark funds for the environment.  One
possible explanation for this finding may be that competing forces make it more difficult for
Democrats to pass legislation earmarking funds for the environment in the years before losing
power, even if they have an increased incentive to do so.  However, further results of this paper do
not support this hypothesis.  Rather, the evidence suggests Democrats do not earmark strategically.
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Environmental Earmarking 
 
I.  Introduction   
This paper presents and tests the hypothesis that legislators earmark funds in order to constrain 
the spending of future legislators with different preferences.  The practice of earmarking taxes has been 
popular in the United States.  According to the Tax Foundation, states on average earmarked a sizeable 
54% of tax revenues in 1954.
1  Though this average has decreased in recent decades, earmarking has 
maintained its standing as a significant budgetary policy practice  with states earmarking on average 
somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of tax revenues in each year surveyed from 1979 to 1997 
(FPSi, 2000).
2  
The effects of earmarking revenues has received a fair amount of attention in the academic 
literature.  Most empirical studies on the subject have focused on the effects of earmarking on 
expenditures.  A review of these studies can be found in Novarro (2003).  Other empirical studies explore 
the effects of earmarking on revenues or rent-seeking behaviors via the actions of organized interest 
groups (Wyrick and Arnold, 1989; Kimenyi, Lee, and Tollison, 1990).  Theoretical papers on the subject 
have focused for the most part on situations in which earmarking may be efficient or optimal (see 
Buchannan, 1963; Goetz, 1968; Browning, 1975; Athanassakos, 1990; McMahon and Sprenkle, 1972; 
Jiang, 2001; Bos, 2000; Pirttila, 1999; Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2000).  
While much has been written describing the effects of earmarking in terms of government finance 
or outcomes of earmarking in terms of efficiency, a puzzle remains as to why policy-makers would 
choose to enact earmarking legislation in the first place.  Why would a rational government in one period 
willfully place restrictions on its own budgetary discretion in a future period?  A recent paper by Bret and 
                                                 
1 Earmarking is defined as precommitting or designating funds for a specific program.  In this paper, the dedication 
must occur via the state’s constitution or statutes to qualify as an earmarked tax. 
2 Though common, earmarking as a practice has been hotly debated in policy and academic circles.  Wilkinson 
(1994) and McCleary (1991) summarize and discuss recent political and economic arguments for and against 
earmarking.   4
Keen proposes a model in which earmarking is more likely to occur when a politically weak incumbent 
has a higher probability of being replaced by a policy maker with divergent preferences (Bret and Keen, 
2000).  This model suggests a possible rationale for why legislators might choose to pass earmarking 
legislation.  Specifically, current legislators with expectations that the future budgetary authority will not 
favor their own pet program might pass legislation earmarking funds for the program in order to ensure its 
financing in the future. 
Models describing the actions of a current government when being succeeded by government 
with different preferences have been explored in a variety of contexts unrelated to the earmarking 
literature.  Persson and Svensson (1989) show that a conservative government may borrow more when it 
knows it will be succeeded by a more expansionary government than when it knows it will remain in 
power in the future. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) develop a model that explains budget deficits as the 
result of current voters’ inability to bind the choices of future voters.  Alesina and Tabellini (1987 and 
1989) and Tabellini (1989) analyze general equilibrium models in which two parties with different 
preferences for the level of public spending and the level of taxation randomly alternate holding power in 
office.  Each of these studies suggest that uncertainty about who will have policy-making power in the 
future can lead to policy choices that would not have otherwise been made. 
This paper explores whether Democrats who control the state legislature are more likely to 
earmark funds for the environment in cases in which they expect to lose this control to a Republican 
government in the future.  As a proxy for Democrats’ prior election expectations, this paper uses data on 
whether or not Democrats in control of the state legislature actually lost control after the next election 
under the assumption that actual loss is correlated with expected loss of power.   
The focus on laws that earmark funds for environmental purposes stems from a few factors.  First, 
earmarking taxes for environmental protection is a common practice in the United States.
3  Table 1 ranks 
the most common recipients in terms of dollar amounts of earmarked taxes received in 1997.   
                                                 
3 Earmarking taxes for environmental protection is also common in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, British 
Columbia, Britain, and Japan (Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2000).   5
Conservation (which includes natural resources, wildlife, fisheries, land acquisition, parks and recreation, 
and historical preservation) ranks sixth having received $1051.4 million in earmarked taxes in 1997 and 
environmental clean-up (hazardous substance clean up, control, prevention, abatement and remediation, 
solid waste management, water quality assurance, liter control, and reclamation projects) ranks eighth 
having received $537 million in earmarked taxes in 1997 (FSPi, 20000).  Second, the environment 
represents a foundational political platform of the Democratic Party.  Two recent polls by Gallop (June 
12, 2002) and Zogby (June 18, 2002) suggest that voters trust the Democratic Party more than the 
Republican party to deal with environmental issues.  As such, the environment represents a program for 
which Democrats might fear loss of funding when a Republican government holds political power.   
Finally, as Bret and Keen (2000) couched their theory of earmarking in terms of the environment, this 
seems the most natural setting in which to test the implications of their model.  
The results of this study provide no support for the hypothesis that Democrats earmark in order to 
constrain their Republican successors.  In fact, Democrats with a large majority who subsequently lose 
this majority power following the next election are found to be less likely to earmark funds for the 
environment.  One possible explanation for this finding could be that competing forces make it more 
difficult for Democrats to pass legislation earmarking funds for the environment in the years before losing 
power, even if they have an increased incentive to do so.  However, further results do not find any effect 
of Democrats subsequently losing power on total environmental expenditures. This later finding suggests 
that Democrats do not have less power to enact their favored policies in the years preceding the loss of 
power.  Rather it seems Democrats do not earmark strategically.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the empirical model.  
Section III describes the data.  Section IV presents the results.  Section V explores competing forces to 
earmarking legislation.  Section VI concludes.   6
II.  Model 
The main empirical model can be described by 
st t s st st st st st T S X SizeMaj ol LosesContr Control LawPassed ε β β β β + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1  
where the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the state passed any laws earmarking taxes 
for the environment in that year and zero otherwise.  Note that the indicator equals one in the year a law 
passes and zero in each following year until new legislation that earmarks taxes for the environment is 
passed.  Controlst represents a vector of dummy variables indicating a party majority in both the state 
house and senate.  Under the assumption that a party that controls the entire legislature can successfully 
pass its most preferred policies into law, and that Democrats favor higher spending on environmental 
programs in comparison to Republicans, the expected coefficient on Controlst is nonpositive for the 
Republican party and nonnegative for the Democratic party.  All else equal, legislatures in which 
Republicans control both houses are at most equally likely to pass environmental earmarking laws as 
legislatures with split control.  Likewise, legislatures in which Democrats control both houses are at least 
equally likely to pass environmental earmarking laws as legislatures with split control.  LosesControlst 
represents a vector of dummy variables indicating a party currently has control of both the state house and 
senate, but loses control of one or both parties after the next election.  Assuming election outcomes are 
correlated with Democrats’ expectations of election outcomes, the coefficient on the variable indicating 
that Democrats lose their complete control of the legislature is expected to have a positive sign.  This 
prediction is based on the hypothesis that, all else equal, Democrats in control of both the house and 
senate earmark in order to ensure funding for programs that benefit the environment when they predict 
that they will be forced to give up some of their budgetary authority to the Republicans after the next 
election.  A nonpositive coefficient is expected on the variable indicating that Republicans lose their 
complete control of the legislature.  SizeMajst represents a vector of variables that control for the size of a 
party’s majority.  The size of the majority for the Democratic party equals the minimum fraction of 
Democrats in the house and senate when the Democratic party holds control of both.  The size of the   7
majority for the Republican party has a parallel construction.
4  A party with a large majority can more 
easily pass its preferred policies into law.  However, a party with a large majority has a higher likelihood 
of remaining in power after the next election, all else equal, and therefore has less of a need to pass 
earmarking legislation.  As such, the expected sign of the coefficient on this variable is ambiguous.  
Interacting the size of the majority with the indicator for losing control of the legislature, however, leads 
to a clear prediction.  Specifically, Democrats with a large majority who subsequently lose control of the 
legislature are expected to be more likely to earmark funds for the environment.  This prediction stems 
from the combined assertions that Democrats with a large majority have an easier time getting legislation 
passed, and that Democrat who expect to lose control of the legislature have an increased incentive to 
pass environmental earmarking legislation in order to constrain the spending of their successors.    
So far the discussion has completely ignored the political affiliation of the state’s governor.  A 
state’s governor has the power to veto any bill accepted by the house and senate.  If a governor does veto 
a bill, generally only a two-thirds majority in both the house and senate can override the veto.   
Conceptually, for the analysis here, the governor can be considered on par with the legislature.  Complete 
political control, in this case, would require a majority in the senate and house as well as having a 
governor of the same party.  A party loses control, and under the hypothesis passes earmarking 
legislation, when it no longer has a majority in either house or when the governor changes party after an 
election.  On the other hand, the politics of a veto may be very different from the politics of simply voting 
no on an environmental earmarking bill.  A veto may be more conspicuous and significant in the eyes of 
the constituency.  Because arguments can be made for treating the governor either as equivalent to or 
distinct from the legislature, this paper empirically explores both models. 
A potential problem with the analysis in the previous paragraph is that the occurrence of a party 
losing control of the state legislature may be closely correlated with other factors that affect the likelihood 
of environmental earmarking.  For example, suppose Democrats in power only earmark more frequently 
                                                 
4 The size of the majority variable has a range of 0 to 0.5 where 0 indicates a lack of majority for that party and .5 
indicates a full majority for that party.   8
when they expect to be replaced by Republicans as the majority party after the next election.  Suppose 
Democrats in power also pass environmental earmarking legislation when they have a large 
environmentally-conscious constituency reminding them to do so.  As the indicator for Democrats 
holding the majority in both the house and senate and subsequently losing this control after the next 
election is likely to be correlated with a decreasing environmentally-conscious constituency, the 
coefficient on the Democrat indicator in LosesControlst may be biased downward.  To ameliorate this 
problem, it would be ideal to include a control that measures the level of support the constituency has for 
environmental earmarking in each year.  Several variables are considered as proxies for this measure and 
are included as state demographic controls (represented by Xst in the equation above).  Proxies 
experimented with include the fraction of voters who identify themselves as Democrats, the fraction of 
voters who identify themselves as Liberals, and the state citizen ideology (the mean position on a liberal-
conservative continuum of the active electorate in a state) and government ideology (the mean position on 
a liberal-conservative continuum of the elected public officials in a state weighted according to power) as 
constructed in Berry et al. (1998).
5     
Several other institutional and demographic controls thought to affect the likelihood of 
environmental earmarking are included in Xst.  Institutional controls include an indicator for whether the 
state has spending limits and an indicator for whether the state has a supermajority tax requirement.  
Spending limits include both tax and expenditure limits.  Nine states have adopted binding spending 
limits between 1984 and 1997, the time period under study.
 6  The most common type of spending limit 
restricts the growth rate of general fund expenditures or revenues to the growth rate of personal income or 
the rate of population and inflation (Poterba and Rueben, 1999).  Given the stricter limits on expenditures 
                                                 
5Berry et al. construct measures of state citizen and government ideology based on roll call voting scores of state 
congressional delegations, the outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, the 
party of the governor, and various assumptions regarding voters and political elites.  A better proxy would be 
something more directly related to a voter’s level of environmental concern, such as membership in environmental 
organizations.  Unfortunately, the largest national environmental organizations, the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, do 
not track membership by state. 
6 In the analysis here, the indicator for whether a state has a spending limit equals one only when that spending limit 
is binding.  In other states, a legislative majority can override the advised spending limit.   9
in states with spending limits, legislators from these states may fear their pet program has a greater chance 
of facing funding cuts in the future and therefore may be more likely to pass earmarking legislation when 
they have the opportunity to do so.  As such the expected sign of the coefficient on the indicator for 
having a spending limit is positive.  Unlike revenue limits, supermajority tax requirements do not cap 
existing taxes.  However, a legislative majority (usually of three-fifths, two-thirds, or three-fourths) is 
required to pass any new taxes.  Nine states instituted supermajority requirements between 1984 and 
1997.  The coefficient on the variable indicating a supermajority tax requirement is ambiguous.  On the 
one hand, the difficulty in raising additional taxes may motivate legislators to pass earmarking legislation 
to ensure funding for their pet program if the budget gets tight in the future.  On the other hand, legislators 
may find it easier to pass legislation that earmarks funds from new taxes as opposed to legislation that 
earmarks funds from taxes already in place.  As such the predicted coefficient could be positive or 
negative depending on the accuracy and strength of these opposing claims.  A control for the number of 
environmental earmarking laws already in effect is also included as this could affect the likelihood of 
legislators passing new, additional environmental earmarking laws.  State revenue per capita and the state 
unemployment rate are also included as demographic controls.   
State fixed effects, represented by Ss in the equation above, control for state-specific propensities 
to earmark funds for the environment that do not change over time.  For example, a particular state may 
have a stronger proclivity for earmarking taxes in general for any purpose.    Year fixed effects,   
represented by Tt in the equation above, control for year-specific propensities to earmark funds for the 
environment that do not differ across states.  These include factors that affect the nation as a whole in a 
particular year, such as the introduction of new federal legislation designed to protect the environment.   
III.  Data 
  The ideal dataset would contain detailed current and historical information on each state law 
earmarking funds for the environment.  Constructing this dataset is difficult in practice.  Because in 
theory a state could pass legislation earmarking the revenues from any source for the environment, 
finding all such laws would require an exhaustive examination of each state’s legislation.  The issue   10
becomes especially complex as laws passed at one date may be repealed at another date.  As a result, 
examining the current legislation in every state for a given year would not be sufficient.   
In an attempt to get as close to the ideal dataset as possible, this paper utilizes four reports that 
detail earmarked state tax revenues for four particular years.  Fiscal Planning Services, Inc. (FPSi) 
published a comprehensive report describing all dedicated state tax revenues for the year 1997 (FPSi, 
2000).  The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) published three reports providing 
information for the years 1984, 1988 and 1993 (NCSL, years).  FPSi based its report on states’ published 
statutes supplemented with legislative reports and documents and a review by the state tax agency.  NCSL 
relied on surveys of state officials. As a result, though FPSi describes its methodology as consistent with 
the methodology adopted by the NCSL, the FPSi report appears more detailed and complete.
7 
  The history of each statute that earmarked funds for the environment listed in the FPSi report was 
researched using Lexis, Westlaw, and hardcopies of previously published statutes.  The NCSL reports do 
not cite statutes, but current and historical statutes were found in most cases using Lexis and Westlaw.  
State legislative offices and state law libraries were contacted in unclear cases for verification.  This study 
focuses on the period from 1984, the year covered in the first NCSL report, through 1997, the year 
covered in the most recent FPSi report.  Though a number of laws listed in these reports were passed prior 
to 1984, focusing the study on 1984-1997 provides the most consistent methodology as laws may have 
been passed and subsequently repealed prior to 1984, leading to their exclusion from these reports.   
Decisions made in creating the dataset for this study included how to define earmarking and what 
to include as a benefit to the environment.  Certain laws included in the FPSi and NCLS reports were 
excluded from the dataset.  FPSi defines earmarked as “…those receipts directed to specific purposes as 
established in statute and which can only be redirected through subsequent changes in law or acts of the 
legislature through the appropriations process...” (FPSi, 2000).  This study followed the definition 
provided by FPSi but excluded laws that granted the legislature any year-by-year budgetary discretion.  
                                                 
7 FPSi left out only 3 laws earmarking taxes for the environment that were reported in NCSL surveys and were still 
in effect as of 1997.   11
Alaska is not included in this study as the Alaska constitution places strong prohibitions on the practice of 
earmarking funds.
8  Determining which earmarked laws have the purpose of benefiting the environment 
presents another challenge.  Laws that earmark funds for forests and marine life are included if the 
statutory language describes conservation or preservation purposes and excluded if statutory language 
describes commercial or economic development purposes.  Completely excluded from the study are laws 
that earmark funds for the promotion of state livestock, agricultural purposes, and water development 
projects.   
Though the FPSi report represents a careful and complete study of earmarked taxes in 1997, FPSi 
does not include other revenue sources such as fees, penalties, or assessments in its report.
9  The prior 
NCSL reports do include some revenues designated as “fees” or “assessments”.  These statutes were not 
included in the study in order to retain consistency with the FPSi report.
10  This omission represents one 
limitation of the data for the current study as the hypothesis in question makes no distinction between 
taxes and other revenue sources.  A second limitation concerns the frequency of the published reports.  
The current study would miss any laws both enacted and repealed between the years included in the 
reports.  However, as described below, legislators infrequently repealed these laws.  A more significant 
disadvantage of the dataset is the lack of information on the restrictiveness of each law in terms of 
constraints placed on the state budget authorities.  Ideally this study would weight laws by their potential 
strength.
11   
  This study includes 105 laws passed between 1984 and 1997 that earmark funds for the 
environment.  Eight of these laws were subsequently repealed. Four repeals occurred during or before 
1997 and four occurred since 1997.  Every law earmarking funds for the environment detailed in the 
                                                 
8 The constitution prohibits earmarking except for the Alaska Permanent Fund, when required by the federal 
government, and for dedicated funds in existence prior to the constitution.  The legislature has, however, found it 
convenient to establish special accounts in the general fund to track certain kinds of revenues and expenditures 
(FPSi, 2000).  
9 FPSi distinguishes between taxes and other revenue sources based on statutory language stating  “… if statutory 
language referred to a revenue source as a tax, and if it directed a portion or all of its receipts to a specific purpose, 
then it was included in this report” (FPSi, 2000).    
10 A total of  12 fees, surcharges, or assessment were included in NCSL reports and not in the FPSi report.   
Regressions results that include these statutes are qualitatively unchanged. 
11 This would require an extreme amount of detailed data  to construct in practice.   12
reports was included except four for which legislation describing the earmarking could not be found.
12  
Table 2 breaks down the number of laws passed by state.  The majority of states passed one or two laws 
earmarking funds for the environment during this time period.  Ten states did not pass any such 
earmarking laws.  Washington passed the most laws at eight followed closely by California and Florida at 
seven.  The most common taxes earmarked for the environment during this time period were petroleum 
and motor fuel taxes (19 states), mineral severance taxes (10 states), real estate transfer taxes (9 states), 
dry-cleaning, pollutants, and hazardous substance taxes (9 states), and sales and use taxes (6 states).  
Table 3 breaks down earmarking laws passed during 1984-1997 by the environmental program designated 
as the recipient of the earmarked taxes.  Earmarking laws most frequently designate funds for 
conservation projects, hazardous waste and cleanup of underground storage tanks, and air and water 
pollution control. 
Information on the number of legislators and their political party membership for each state’s 
house and senate come from The Book of States.  As Nebraska has a unicameral, nonpartisan legislature, 
this state is dropped from the analysis.
13  Election years also come primarily from The Book of States.
14  
Information on state spending limits and state supermajority tax requirements come from Poterba and 
Rueben (1999).  Data on citizen and government ideology as defined by Berry et al. (1998) are from the 
ICPSR Publication-Related Archive.  Estimates of the fraction of citizens in each state who are 
Democrats, Republicans, Liberal, and Conservative come from CBS News-New York Times polls as 
compiled by Wright et. al (1985) and downloaded from website.  State population data by age and in total 
are from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Reports.  State personal income data are from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Survey of Current Business.  Total state revenue data are from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s State Government Finances annual reports.  Unemployment data are from the Current 
                                                 
12 Of these four, two appeared in the 1997 FPSi study and two appeared only in earlier NCSL studies. 
13 The Nebraska legislature is nonpartisan in that the candidate’s political party is not listed on the election ballot.  In 
addition, Nebraska’s legislative leadership is not based on political party affiliation.  Interestingly, Nebraska has 
passed legislation earmarking funds for the environment.   
14 The Book of States had several errors in the listed election years.  For these, verification of the correct election 
years came from states’ secretary of state elections division.   13
Population Survey (CPS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Total state data on natural resource and 
general expenditures come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s State Government Finances annual reports.  
All nominal dollar values are converted to real dollars values with 1996 as the base year using the gross 
domestic product implicit price deflator obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
 
IV.  Results 
  Table 4 presents the number of environmental earmarking laws passed broken down by political 
control of the senate, house, and governor seat.  During the time period under study, the dataset includes 
209 observations in which Democrats have held control of the entire state legislature and governor seat 
and 85 observations in which Republicans have held complete control.  When ignoring the political party 
of the governor, the gap between the Democrats and Republicans becomes even larger with 374 
observations of Democrats holding a majority in both branches of the legislature compared to 142 
observations for Republicans. Split majorities in the house and senate occur 139 times for Democrats and 
145 times for Republicans.  In terms of frequency, environmental earmarking laws are passed in 12.4% of 
observations with a Democratic governor and a Democratic majority in the house and senate and in 8.2% 
with a Republican governor and a Republican majority in the house and senate.  Ignoring the political 
party of the governor, these numbers grow to 13.1% and 11.8% respectively.  The fact that these laws 
have been passed more frequently when the Democrats control the legislature (and governor seat) fits 
with the predictions of the model.  Interestingly, earmarking laws have been passed with the highest 
frequency, 21%, when Democrats have held the majority in the Senate and the Republicans have held the 
majority in the house.  
In Table 5, the number of environmental earmarking laws passed is broken down by the number 
of observations in which Democrats and Republicans controlled the government, but subsequently lost 
this control after the next election.  Environmental earmarking laws passed in 23.2% of the 43 
observations in which Democrats held the majority in the senate and house but lost this majority in one or 
both houses following the next election.  For the Republican party, the frequency is 19.2% of 26   14
observations.  With the addition of the requirement that the governor also have the same  political 
identity, Democrats passed environmental earmarking laws in 19.7% of the 66 observations while 
Republicans passed these laws in 6.7% of the 15 observations in which the party subsequently loses either 
the majority in the house or senate (or both) or the governor seat.   
When comparing the frequency of the enactment of environmental earmarking laws broken down 
by party control, the raw numbers described in Table 4 and Table 5 follow the predicted direction.   
Specifically, a strongly Democratic government passes these laws more frequently than a strongly 
Republican government.  In addition, Democrats in power who subsequently lose their legislative 
majority pass these laws more frequently than similarly situated Republicans.  This last finding is 
consistent the hypothesis that Democrats earmark for the environment in order to constrain the spending 
of Republicans who will soon come to power.   
These raw numbers, while quite suggestive, do not control for the many differences between 
states that may affect the propensity to pass earmarking legislation.  Starting from a simple probit 
regression that includes only the indicators for a party having majority control and for a party losing 
majority control, the positive and significant relationship disappears with the addition of state fixed 
effects.  If the governor seat is ignored, the positive and significant relationship also disappears with the 
inclusion of either a spending limit dummy or an indicator for the number of earmarking laws already in 
effect in the state.  These findings indicate that the relationship suggested by the raw data may be driven 
by underlying differences in states’ likelihood of passing environmental earmarking legislation that is 
correlated with but not caused by changes in legislative power. 
 Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients from regressing the equation described above (which 
includes all the regressors) as a probit model.  For the regressions in Table 6, the governor is treated as 
separate from the house and senate in defining what constitutes a majority of legislative power.  In the 
first regression, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating Democrats lose control of their senate 
and house majority is positive, as expected, but not statistically significant.  In fact the coefficient on the 
dummy variable indicating Republicans lose control of their majority is also positive, with an even   15
slightly larger point estimate, though again not statistically significant.  The one variable that stands out 
as having a clear impact on the probability a new environmental earmarking law is passed in a particular 
state and year is the number of earmarking laws already in effect.  The stock of environmental earmarking 
laws already on the books has a statistically significant negative impact on the likelihood of passing new 
laws.  The coefficient of –0.53 translates into a decrease of 9% in the probability of passing new 
environmental laws.  None of the remaining controls have a apparent influence. 
The second regression in Table 6 adds controls for the size of the Democratic and Republican 
majority.  The estimated coefficients suggest a positive relationship between the size of the Democratic 
majority and the probability of passing environmental earmarking laws and a negative relationship 
between the size of the Republican majority and the probability.  However, again neither of these 
coefficients have statistical significance.   The estimated coefficients on the remaining regressors included 
change little as a result of adding the size of majority controls. 
The third regression in Table 6 includes a term that interacts the size of the majority with the 
indicator for losing senate and house majority control.  If Democrats can somewhat accurately predict 
losing power after the next election, the expected sign on this coefficient for the Democrats is positive.  
Democrats with a larger majority will find it easier to pass legislation that ensures funding for 
environmental programs, and given that Republicans will be in control after the next election, Democrats 
have an increased incentive to ensures such funding.  The estimated coefficient on this interaction term, 
however, turns out to be negative for Democrats and positive for Republicans, though neither is 
statistically significant.  The estimated coefficients on the remaining regressors remain largely unchanged. 
The fourth regression in Table 6 includes an interaction of the indicator for losing majority 
control with an indicator for the year before the election in order to explore issues related to the timing of 
the enactment of environmental earmarking legislation.  If Democrats have an increased probability of 
enacting earmarking legislation when they expect to lose a significant number of legislative seats to 
Republicans, they may be even more likely to pass this legislation when the danger becomes imminent in   16
the year before the election.  The estimated coefficient on this interaction term, however, is positive, but 
again not statistically significant. 
The final regression in Table 6 includes the interaction of the indicator for losing majority control 
with the size of the majority with the indicator for the year before the election.  The triple interaction 
terms have a negative, non-statistically significant point estimate for the Democrats, and a positive 
estimated coefficient for the Republicans that is significant at the 10% level.  Contrary to the hypothesis 
discussed above, the positive estimated coefficient for the Republicans suggests that Republicans with a 
larger majority have a higher probability of earmarking when the loss of majority control becomes 
imminent.      
In Table 7, the implications of holding control of the houses of the legislature as well as the 
governor seat and subsequently losing control of at least one of these is explored.  The results of the first 
two regressions are qualitatively similar to the results reported in the first two regressions of Table 6.  In 
the third regression, which includes the interaction between the indicator for losing political control and 
the size of the majority, the indicator for Democrats lose their political control is negative and significant 
at the 1% level.  This suggests that Democrats with a larger majority have a decreased probability of 
passing environmental earmarking laws before subsequently losing majority control.  One possible 
explanation is that Democrats with a larger majority underestimate the likelihood that they will lose 
power after the next election, and as a result, they do not see a need to earmark for the environment.  The 
coefficient on the interaction between the indicator for losing majority control interacted with the size of 
the majority and the year before the election indicator, reported in the fourth regression of Table 7, is 
significant at the 10% level and also has a negative sign.   This suggests that Democrats with a larger 
majority have a decreased probability of passing environmental earmarking laws even when the loss of 
majority control becomes imminent.   
The results from Table 6 and Table 7 provide no evidence for the hypothesis that Democrats 
earmark for the environment in order to ensure a minimum level of spending on the environment by 
Republicans who gain power in the future.  As discussed previously, the fraction of the population that   17
identify themselves as Democrats is included to control for changing attitudes toward environmental 
spending over time.  However, perhaps this measure does not constitute an adequate control.   
Unfortunately, surveys of environmental attitudes that cover all states over the time period under study 
are not available.
15  Table 8 experiments with three alternative measures of citizen ideology:  the fraction 
of the population who identify themselves as liberal, a measure of citizen ideology, and a measure of 
government ideology.  Note higher scores on the two ideology measures denotes a higher degree of 
liberalism.  The results of Table 8 follow the same pattern as those reported earlier, with the exception 
that the indicator for a state having a spending limit achieves statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
V.  An Investigation of Competing Forces to Earmarking Legislation 
The results of the previous section do not support the hypothesis that Democrats in power 
earmark for the environment in order to constrain spending by their Republican successors.  One possible 
explanation for this finding could be the presense of competing forces between the incentives for 
Democrats to pass this legislation and their ability to do so in practice.  Democrats in power who 
subsequently lose this power to Republicans have an increased incentive to pass earmarking legislation.  
However, the same forces that lead to the loss of power by Democrats may make it increasingly difficult 
for Democrats to pass their proposed bills.  In other words, Democrats may have already lost power in the 
legislature before the election takes place.  If so, this competing force could account for the lack of an 
observed relationship between Democrats losing power and the probability of passing earmarking 
legislation. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, Table 9 shows regression results obtained from using the 
fraction of the state budget spent on natural resources as the dependent variable.  If Democrats in power 
                                                 
15 Berry et al. states “The deficiencies of current indicators of ideology could be eliminated if we had direct access to 
citizen’s and leaders’ political orientations.  Unfortunately, surveys of citizens’ attitudes are only available for some 
states, and then only in selected years” (Berry et al., 1998, p. 329).  Wright, Erikson, and McIver state, “The reason 
for the underdeveloped nature of research on state electorates is not theoretical but practical.  We simply do not have 
data at the state level comparable to the in-depth surveys provided by the National Election Studies and other 
national surveys” (Wright et al, 1985).   
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have a decreased ability to enact policy changes during the term before Republicans take control, they 
would be less likely to support the environment in other ways.  As such, the fraction of the state budget 
spent on natural resources would also decrease in the period before losing power.  The first regression of 
Table 9 includes a dummy variable indicating Democrats lose control of their senate and house majority.  
The estimated coefficient does not differ statistically from zero.  As such, there is no evidence that 
Democrats have a decreased ability to support environmental causes in the years before losing power to 
Republicans.  The remaining regressions in Table 9 include various other controls.  However, the 
coefficient on the indicator for Democrats lose control of their senate and house majority does not differ 
statistically from zero in any of these specifications. 
The second regression in Table 9 adds controls for the size of the Democratic and Republican 
majority.  As expected, a larger Democratic majority in the legislature is associated with a higher fraction 
of the budget going towards natural resource expenditures.  The third regression in Table 9 includes a 
term that interacts the size of the majority with the indicator for losing senate and house majority control.  
The fourth regression in Table 9 includes an interaction of the indicator for losing majority control with 
an indicator for the year before the election.  The final regression in Table 9 includes the interaction of the 
indicator for losing majority control with the size of the majority with the indicator for the year before the 
election.  None of these interaction terms achieve statistical significance. 
Overall, the results of Table 9 combined with the previous results suggest that Democrats do not 
have less power to enact their favored policies in the years preceding the loss of power.  Rather it seems 
Democrats may not earmark strategically to constrain Republican successors.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Earmarking taxes is a common practice in the United States.  Despite its widespread appeal 
among policy-makers, few researchers have studied the reasons legislators have for placing restrictions on 
their own ability to budget funds.  This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that legislators earmark for 
the environment in order to constrain the budget of successors with divergent policy preferences.  The   19
results of the paper do not support this hypothesis.  In fact, it appears that Democrats with a larger 
majority earmark less in the period before losing political control of the state legislature. As further 
results of this paper suggest that these Democrats do not suffer from a decrease in political power to 
budget expenditures for natural resources in general, it seems that Democrats do not earmark strategically.  
From a political standpoint, legislators could benefit from understanding the advantages of using 
earmarking as a commitment tool for future budgetary decision-makers. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the question remains as to what actually does motivate legislators 
to earmark funds.   Several alternative theories come to mind.  An assumption inherent in the empirical 
model of this paper is that earmarking has no impact on election outcomes.  If this assumption is false and 
in fact passing earmarking legislation does affect the majority status of political parties, the empirical 
estimates presented in this paper suffer from endogeneity bias.  An empirical model that tests for any 
effects of earmarking on re-election outcomes would be useful.  Another possibility is that earmarking 
funds helps legislators get support for passing new taxes.  An empirical model that tests the likelihood of 
passing a new tax as a function of whether or not the proposed bill earmarks the proceeds would be 
enlightening in this regard.  Certainly the puzzling question of why so many taxes are earmarked would 




Athanassakos, A. (1990).  “General Fund Financing Versus Earmarked Taxes:  An Alternative Model of 
Budgetary Choice in Democracy.”  Public Choice, 66(3): 261-278. 
 
Berry, W., Ringquist, E., Fording, R. and Hanson, R. (1998). “Measuring Citizen Government Ideology 
in the American States, 1960-93.”  American Journal of Political Science, 42(1): 327-348. 
 
Bos, D. (2000).  “Earmarked Taxation:  Welfare Versus Political Support.”  Journal of Public Economics, 
75(3): 439-462. 
 
Bowman, J. (1974).  “Tax Exportability, Intergovernmental Aid, and School Finance Reform.” National 
Tax Journal, 27(2): 163-174. 
 
Browning, E. (1975).  “Collective Choice and General Fund Financing.”  Journal of Political Economy, 
83(2): 377-390.  
 
Buchanan, J. (1963).  “The Economics of Earmarked Taxes.”  Journal of Political Economy, 71(5): 475-
469. 
 
Cashel-Cordo, P. and Craig, S. (1997).  “Donor Preferences and Recipient Fiscal Behavior:  A 
Simultaneous Analysis of Foreign Aid.” Economic Inquiry, 35(3): 653-671. 
 
Cashel-Cordo, P. and Craig, S. (1990).  “The Public Sector Impact of International Resource Transfers.”  
Journal of Development Economics, 32(1): 17-42. 
 
Chernick, H. (1979).  “An Econometric Model of the Distribution of Project Grants.” In Peter 
Mieszkowski and William Oakland, eds., Fiscal Federalism and Grants-In-Aid, Washington, 
D.C.:  The Urban Institute.   
 
Deran, E. (1965).  “Earmarking and Expenditures:  A Survey and a New Test.” National Tax Journal, 18: 
354-361. 
 
Dhillon, A. and Perroni, C. (2001).  “Tax Earmarking and Grass-Roots Accountability.”   
Economic Letters, 72(1): 99-106. 
 
Fabricius, M. and Snell, R. (1990).  Earmarking State Taxes.  Second Edition.  National  
Conference of state Legislatures, Denver, Colorado. 
 
Feldstein, M. (1975).  “Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education.” American Economic 
Review, 65(1): 75-89. 
 
Feyzioglu, T., Swaroop, V., and Zhu, M. (1998).  “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign 
Aid.” The World Bank Economic Review, 12(1): 29-58. 
 
Fiscal Planning Services, Incorporated (2000).  Dedicated State Tax Revenues:  A Fifty-State  
Report. 
   21
Franco-Rodriguez, S. (2000).  “Recent Developments in Fiscal Response with an Application to Costa 
Rica.” Journal of International Development, 12(3): 429-441. 
 
Gang, I. and Khan, H. (1991).  “Foreign Aid, Taxes, and Public Investment.” Journal of Development 
Economics, 34(1-2): 355-369. 
 
Goetz, C. (1968).  “Earmarked Taxes and the Majority Rule Budget Process.”  American Economic 
Review, 58: 128-136. 
 
Gold, S., Erickson, B., and Kissell, M. (1987).  Earmarking State Taxes.  Edited by S. Schwoch.   
National Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colorado and Washington, D.C. 
 
Heller, P. (1975).  “A Model of Public Fiscal Behavior in Developing Countries:  Aid, Investment, and 
Taxation.” The American Economic Review, 65(3): 429-445. 
 
Inman, R. (1978).  “Optimal Fiscal Reform of Metropolitan Schools:  Some Simulation Results.” 
American Economic Review, 68(1): 107-122.  
 
Islam, M. and Choudhury, S. (1990).  “Testing the Exogeneity of Grants to Local Governments.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 23(3): 676-692. 
 
Jiang, T. (2001).  “Earmarking of Pollution Charges and the Sub-Optimality of the Pigouvian  
Tax.”  The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 45(4): 623-640.  
 
Johnson, M. (1979).  “Community Income, Intergovernmental Grants, and Local School District Fiscal 
Behavior.” In Peter Mieszkowski and William Oakland, eds., Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-
Aid, Washington, D.C: The Urban Institute. 
 
Khilji, N. and Zampelli, E. (1991).  “The Fungibility of U.S. Assistance to Developing Countries and the 
Impact on Recipient Expenditures:  A Case Study of Pakistan.”  World Development, 19(8): 
1095-1105. 
 
Khilji, N. and Zampelli, E. (1994).  “The Fungibility of U.S. Military and Non-military Assistance and 
the Impacts on Expenditures of Major Aid Recipients.” Journal of Development Economics, 
43(2): 345-362. 
 
Kimenyi, M., Lee, D., and Tollison, R. (1990).  “Efficient Lobbying and Earmarked Taxes.”   
Public Finance Quarterly, 18(1): 104-113. 
 
Kimenyi, M., Lee, D., and Tollison, R. (1991). “Tax Earmarking and the Optimal Lobbying  
Strategy.”  Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and 
Practice, London and New York: Routedge: 141-151.  
 
Ladd, H. (1975).  “Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity, and the Composition of the Property 
Tax Base.” National Tax Journal, 28(2): 145-158. 
 
Marsiliani, L., and Renstrom, T. (2000).  “Time Inconsistency In Environmental Policy:  Tax Earmarking 
as a Commitment Solution.”  The Economic Journal, 110: C123-C138. 
 
McCleary, W. (1991).  “The Earmarking of Government Revenue:  A Review of Some World  
Bank Experience.”  The World Bank Research Observer, 6(1): 81-104.   22
 
McGuire, M. (1978).  “A Method For Estimating the Effect of a Subsidy on the Receiver’s Resource 
Constraint: With an Application to U.S. Local Governments, 1964-1971.” Journal of Public 
Economics, 10(1): 25-44. 
 
McGuire, M. (1987).  “Foreign Assistance, Investment and Defense:  A Methodological Study with an 
Application to Israel, 1960-1979.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 35(4): 847-873. 
 
McGuire, M. (1982).  “U.S. Foreign Assistance, Israeli Resource Allocation and the Arms Race in the 
Middle East: An Analysis of Three Interdependent Resource Allocation Processes.” In The 
Economics of Military Expenditures: Military Expenditures, Economic Growth and Fluctuations, 
proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association in Paris, France: 
197-238. 
 
McMahon, W., and Sprenkle, C. (1972).  “Earmarking and the Theory of Public Expenditure.” National 
Tax Journal, 25(2): 229-230. 
 
National Association of State Budget Officers. (2001).  2000 State Expenditure Report.   
 
Novarro, N. (2003).  “Does Earmarking Matter?  The Case of State Lottery Profits and Educational 
Spending.”  Stanford University Dissertation. 
 
Olmsted, G., Denzau, A., and Roberts, J. (1993).  “We Voted for This?  Institutions and Educational 
Spending.” Journal of Public Economics, 52(3): 363-376. 
 
Pack, H. and Pack, J. (1993).  “Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility.”  Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 75(2): 258-265. 
 
Pack, H. and Pack, J. (1990).  “Is Foreign Aid Fungible?  The Case of Indonesia.” Economic Journal, 
100(399): 188-194. 
 
Pérez, A., and Snell, R. (1995).  Earmarking State Taxes.  Third Ediction.  National Conference  
of State Legislatures, Denver, Colorado. 
 
Peterson, G. (1975).  “Voter Demand for Public School Expenditures.” In John E. Jackson, ed., Public 
Needs and Private Behavior in Metropolitan Areas, Cambridge, MA:  Ballinger.  
 
Phelps, C. (1969).  “Real and Monetary Determinants of State and Local Highway Investment, 1951-66.” 
American Economic Review, 59(4): 507-521. 
 
Pirttila, J. (1999).  “Earmarking of Environmental Taxes and Pareto-Efficient Taxation.”  
FinanzArchiv, 56(2): 202-217. 
 
Poterba, J., and Rueben, K. (1999).  Fiscal Rules and State Borrowing Costs:  Evidence from  
California and Other States.  Public Policy Institute of California. 
 
Swaroop, V., Jha, S., and Rajkumar, A. (2000).  “Fiscal Effects of Foreign Aid in a Federal System of 
Governance:  The Case of India.”  Journal of Public Economics, 77(3): 307-330. 
   23
Weicher, J. (1972).  “Aid, Expenditures, and Local Government Structure.”  National Tax Journal, 25(4): 
573-583. 
 
Wilkinson, M. (1994). “Paying for Public Spending:  Is There a Role for Earmarked Taxes?”  
Fiscal Studies, 15(4): 119-135. 
 
Wright, G., Erikson, R., and McIver, J. (1985).  “Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology  
with Survey Data.” Journal of Politics, 47(2): 469-489. 
 
Wyckoff, P. (1991).  “Testing Bureaucratic Influence on Local School Expenditures by Comparing 
Survey and Expenditure Data.”  Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(2): 331-335. 
 
Wyrick, T., and Arnold, R. (1989). “Earmarking as a Deterrent to Rent-Seeking.”  Public Choice,  
60(3): 283-291. 
 
Zampelli, E. (1986).  “Resource Fungibility, the Flypaper Effect and the Expenditure Impact of  
Grants-in-Aid.”  Review of Economics and Statistics, 68(1): 33-40.   24
 
Table 1 
Summary by purpose: Rank order 
 
Purpose  Total Dedicated  
(in millions of 1997 dollars) 
Rank 
Transportation $31,011.6  1 
Education 24,020.2  2 
Local Governments  23,709.6  3 
Health 3,872.3  4 
Debt Service  2,876.5  5 
Conservation 1,051.4  6 
Public Safety  899.7  7 
State Building/Public Works  734.4  8 
Environmental Clean Up  537.0  9 
Human Services  415.8  10 
Tourism 267.2  11 
Housing 145.6  12 
Regulation 98.9  13 
Economic Development  89.5  14 
        Source:  Fiscal Planning Services, Inc. (2000) 
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Table 2 







0  10  AL, AK, GA, KY, MI, NH, RI, TN, UT, WY 
1  14  IN, IA, ME, MN, MS, NE, NV, NM, ND, OH, OR, PA, SC, VT 
2  12  AR, CO, ID, KS, LA, MA, MO, NY, OK, SD, TX, WI 
3  5  DE, HI, IL, MD, VA 
4 1  WV 
5  4  AZ, CT, MT, NJ 
6 1  NC 
7 2  CA,  FL 
8 1  WA 
 





Programs that received earmarked funds 1984-1997 
 
Recipient of earmarked funds  Number laws 
conservation generally  19 
hazardous waste and underground storage tanks  18 
air and water pollution and quality assurance  16 
solid waste cleanup and recycling programs  15 
fish and wildlife  12 
parks 10 
reclamation of lands  8 
forests 7 
 





















Democrats yes  yes  yes  209  26  0.124 
 yes  yes  no  165  23  0.139 
  yes  yes  --  374  49  0.131 
 yes    no  yes  25  2  0.080 
 yes  no  no  29  6  0.207 
  yes  no  --  54  8  0.148 
  no  yes yes  58  7 0.121 
  no  yes no  27  4 0.148 
  no  yes  --  85  11  0.129 
 no  no  yes  70  7  0.100 
 no  no  no  89  7  0.079 
  no  no  --  159  14  0.088 
Republicans  yes yes yes  85  7 0.082 
  yes yes no  57  6 0.105 
  yes  yes  --  142  13  0.118 
 yes    no  yes  23  4  0.174 
 yes  no  no  62  6  0.097 
  yes  no  --  85  10  0.118 
  no  yes yes  30  6 0.200 
  no  yes no  30  3 0.100 
  no  yes  --  60  9  0.150 
 no  no  yes  165  22  0.133 
 no  no  no  220  28  0.127 
  no  no  --  385  50  0.130 
Notes: The Democrats holding power does not equal Republicans not holding power due to ties in the house or     
senate.  A party is defined to hold the majority only if there is a strict majority.  In addition, there are 7 cases in 
which the political party of the governor is independent.   28
 
Table 5 
Summary of number of laws passed by subsequent loss of political control 
 









Democrats       
 lose  Senate-House  majority  43  10  0.232 
  lose Senate-House-Governor majority  66  13  0.197 
Republicans       
 lose  Senate-House  majority  26  5  0.192 
  lose Senate-House-Governor majority  15  1  0.067 
Notes: loses control means had control and lost control after next election of either house, senate, or governor 
seat. 
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Table 6 
 Likelihood of passing earmarking laws by political power   
Dependent variable:  Indicator for whether environmental earmarking law was passed 
 
Method: Probit estimation with state and year fixed effects 
Regression  1 2 3 4 5 
Democrats hold majority of 























Republicans hold majority of 


















































Democrats lose interacted with 
size of majority 





Republicans lose interacted with 
size of majority 
   4.64 
(8.07) 
  
Democrats lose interacted with 
year before election 
    0.12 
(0.58) 
 
Republicans lose interacted with 
year before election 
    0.91 
(0.72) 
 
Democrats lose interacted with 
size maj. and year before 
     -6.91 
(9.20) 
Republicans lose interacted with 
size maj. and year before 
     18.47
* 
(10.74) 










Number of earmarking laws 



















































































     Coefficients on state fixed effects and year fixed effects not shown .  *10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels.   30
Table 7 
 Likelihood of passing earmarking laws by political power 
Dependent variable:  Indicator for whether environmental earmarking law was passed 
 
Method: Probit estimation with state and year fixed effects 
Regression  1 2 3 4 
Democrats hold majority of 






















Republicans hold majority of 








































Democrats lose interacted with 
size of majority 




Republicans lose interacted 
with size of majority 
   5.50 
(23.65) 
 
Democrats lose interacted with 
size maj. and year before 
    - 6 . 0 2
* 
(3.12) 
Republicans lose interacted 
with size maj. and year before 
    69.34 
(52.55) 
Number of earmarking laws 



































































  Coefficients on state fixed effects and year fixed effects not shown .   
  *10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels. 
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Table 8 
 Likelihood of passing earmarking laws by political power   
Dependent variable:  Indicator for whether environmental earmarking law was passed 
 
Method: Probit estimation with state and year fixed effects 
Regression  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Democrats hold majority of 



























Republicans hold majority of 































































Democrats lose interacted 








Republicans lose interacted 
















    























Number of earmarking laws 

























































































     Coefficients on state fixed effects and year fixed effects not shown .  *10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels. 
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Table 9 
 Likelihood of passing earmarking laws by political power   
Dependent variable:  Expenditures on natural resources as a fraction of general expenditures  
 
Method: OLS  estimation with state and year fixed effects 
Regression  1 2 3 4 5 
Democrats hold majority of 




























Republicans hold majority of 





















































Democrats lose interacted with 
size of majority 





Republicans lose interacted with 
size of majority 
   -0.15 
(1.48) 
  
Democrats lose interacted with 
year before election 
    0.06 
(0.12) 
 
Republicans lose interacted with 
year before election 
    0.15 
(0.14) 
 
Democrats lose interacted with 
size maj. and year before 
     0.37 
(1.66) 
Republicans lose interacted with 
size maj. and year before 
     1.72 
(1.93) 










Number of earmarking laws 


















































































     Coefficients on state fixed effects and year fixed effects not shown .  *10%, **5%, ***1% significance levels. 
 
 